of adverse selection in private insurance markets and the impossibility of private markets insuring more existential fortuities. Government insurance also responds to the moral imperatives that animate the covenantal bonds through which we define our society. In the end, brute luck has more to do with the outcomes of our lives than most like to admit; well-designed insurance modulates the worst of these fortuities. The Market Triumphalist view that dominates much current debate rests on the denial of luck; what is required instead is the humility that comes with acknowledging the role of fortune, and with it a commitment to a more empathetic economy. 3 Fiscal Policy is Everyone's Business
• Government exists to spend, not to tax
• We posture about the harms of taxation -e.g. the TCJA debate
• But tax revenues are not simply consumed by bonfires: they purchase public investment and insurance
• Fiscal policy means thinking about the net effect of government spending and taxing
• Both returns to spending and larger social returns, net of their costs
• We should focus -but rarely do -on net effects on our welfare
• Fiscal policy can respond to pressing social issues:
• Inequality
• Stagnant incomes of middle class
• Long-term, broadly-shared economic growth
• The "covenantal bonds" that bind us to each other
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Investment and Insurance
• Government investment generates inclusive growth
• Pie gets larger, and the servings are more broadly shared
• Which in turn is accretive to welfare
• The only instrument that ensures genuine equality of opportunity
• Government insurance is economically efficient . . .
• Responds to adverse selection and more existential fortuities
• . . . And responds to the moral implications of the irreducible role of brute luck in our material outcomes
• Reorients us from the denial of luck that lies at the heart of Market Triumphalism
• Reintroduces an economics of empathy at the heart of our covenantal bonds with fellow citizens http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lss/259
5 Government is Not a Zero-Sum Game
• Government investment and insurance complement the private sector, not compete with it
• By responding to necessarily incomplete markets
• Large positive returns to government spending belie false narrative of makers vs. takers
• Standard metrics don't capture the social returns to government spending
• Government spending is highly progressive in its distributional effects
• Which means we can obtain a more progressive fiscal system without steeply higher progressive tax rates
• But we must revisit our inadequate tax base! • TCJA demonstrated a myopic focus on taxes, not fiscal policy
• And an even more myopic framing of "growth"
• Unsustainable federal deficits color everything
• Greatly exacerbated by TCJA (December 2017)
• Now projected to average 5% of GDP over next 10 years
• Even with 3% growth, deficits projected to swallow the world
• Future financing of deficits will have material welfare implications
• Deficits have no information content by themselves
• Are taxes too low, or spending too high?
• Or are both inadequate to our needs? • USA is 23 rd in OECD in total social spending (GDP %)
• Includes Social Security & Medicare
• And far below average in most income security programs
• Income security spending 2018: 1.5% of GDP; in 2027: 1.3%
• Net investment in infrastructure ≈ zero
• Total nondefense discretionary spending trending towards lowest levels in modern history
U.S. Inequality is Real and Corrosive
• Top 1% more than doubled their share of total national income from1979 -2014 (to 21% of pie)
• And top 0.01% tripled their share (to 5%)
• Top 1% now control 42% of national wealth
• And Top 0.01% own >11% of all national wealth
• Highest adult poverty rate (18-65) in OECD (GDP %)
• Among the highest ratios of rich to poor in OECD
• USA is unique in OECD: high income + high inequality
• "Redistribution" does less in USA than in other rich countries
• Because we do so little of it!
Costs of Inequality
• To begin: inequality is always a relative concept
• From Smith to Veblen to Frank
• Inequality yields immobility • Novel "top-down" approach that starts with NIPAs and distributes all national income to individuals
• Very comprehensive measure
• Responds to criticism over use of tax returns only
Post-1982 Increasing Household Incomes Largely a Story of Second-Earner Spouses
The image part with relationship ID rId3 was not found in the file. Two Levers of Progressivity
• The left's preoccupation with progressive income tax (higher marginal rates) is self-limiting and self-defeating
• Well-designed public spending by itself is progressive in practicethe benefits of that spending are broadly shared
• Steeply progressive tax rates thus are not necessary to finance progressive fiscal systems (the net of spending and taxing)
• Other countries have figured this out
• Germany or the Nordics have more regressive taxation, but a much more progressive net fiscal system, because their commitment to public investment and insurance is larger
• The spending side dominates -mildly regressive taxes can fund progressive net fiscal systems!
More Tax Revenues
• Carbon tax raises $1 trillion over 10 years
• Kleinbard, WSJ, Sept. 24, 2017 • • Capital income tax addresses top-end income inequality
• Wealth of course is highly concentrated
• In turn, capital income tax ≈ periodic wealth tax
• Kleinbard Dual BEIT is revenue-raiser vs. Post-TCJA law
• And is a coherent and comprehensive proposal
• Capital Taxation in an Age of Inequality, 90 So. Cal. L. Rev. 593 (2017) • The Right Tax at the Right Time, 21 Fla. Tax Rev. 208 (2017) New Political Economy of Capital Income Tax
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Nibbled to Death by Ducks -In a Good Way
• A flat rate annual capital income tax preserves symmetry (ex-post risky return efficiency)
• And is progressive along the relevant margin of time
• Capital income very top weighted of course
• Flat rate tax collected annually has increasing effective rate over time -the dreaded "Tax Wedge" in fact is a feature, not a bug
• Tax must be measured and collected annually though
• An annual income tax can raise same revenues with lower nominal rates than an excise tax structure (cap gains today, consumption tax proposals) ("realization")
• An annual tax is less susceptible to tax holiday concerns http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lss/259
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The Dual BEIT, Tweet-Sized
• "Dual" from Nordic dual income taxes
• Rejects notion that "ideal" income tax necessarily imposes identical rates on labor and capital income
• In simplest form, low flat rate on capital income, progressive rates with higher top marginal rate on labor income
• "BEIT" from my fevered imagination
• Business Enterprise Income Tax (proposed rate: 25%)
• "Cash flow equivalent" firm tax using capital account allowance
• Economics ≈ post-TCJA corporate tax @25% + full expensing, BUT no interest deduction
• Similar mechanism (rate x investment) to determine normal returns includible in investors' income, regardless of cash (again @25%)
BEIT Results
• BEIT economics:
• Firm-level profits tax
• Plus investor tax on normal returns
• Equals comprehensive and consistent tax on all capital income from business -de facto "integration"
• Political economy benefits of BEIT:
• Optically closer to current law than a cash flow tax
• Corporate managers happy
• Moves normal return tax to least mobile taxpayers
• More robust than cash flow tax to changes in tax rates, and easier transition (depreciation retained, COCA for interest)
• Radical simplification of tax M&A etc.
http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lss/259
What About the Growth Effects of Tax Cuts?
• Most macro tax models = neoclassical GE growth models
• Greater after-tax returns to labor + capital induce more of each • Do not model distribution of burdens or benefits-more generally, welfare
• Growth effects can come by taking from the poor to give to rich
• Called "dynamic scoring" in budget context
• Modeling future economic growth induced by tax bill, and knockon implications for tax revenues
• Competing theoretical models, all relying on handful of "representative agents" and highly stylized economy
• Highly sensitive to economic assumptions (e.g. Fed response)
• Do not model strategic responses by other countries
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Macro Models & Deficits
• Problem post-TCJA is size of deficits
• Deficits @5% of GDP (CBO 1-2018) in world of 3% or even 4% growth mean that deficits will devour the world!
• Deficits mean that macro models must make up "counterfactual" fiscal policy, including in TCJA analysis • Real growth requires actual implementation of those counterfactual policies, with real distributional consequences
• In TCJA work, counterfactual policy was slashing transfer payments starting in Year 30
Macro Scoring -Whose Growth?
• GDP/GNP growth ≠ aggregate growth in welfare
• "In the . . . simulations, . . .people work and save more over the first ten years in anticipation of a future loss of valued spending or tax increases [in the distant future], because they recognize the need to accumulate more assets against the anticipated lean period later in their life cycle." -JCX-19-06
• I.E., promising to make people poorer in future induces them to work more now to make up for future losses, so GDP goes up
• Is working longer hours and saving rather than consuming to make up for a loss in "valued" benefits welfare enhancing?
• Growth is easily measured, but net welfare gains are not Luck Has Everything to Do With It • Life's outcomes are highly contingent
• We control less of our personal destinies that we like to admit.
Our health, accidents (good and bad), wholly fortuitous eventsall these change our outcomes.
• And we do not choose the lives into which we are born -not our parents, not our personal attributes.
• Market Triumphalism = the denial of luck
• It misreads market outcomes as efficient outcomes
• It ignores both fortuities and incomplete real world markets
• It professes objective and scientific advice, but does so for the benefit of a world other than the one in which we actually live
• And it is immature in its political philosophy, in claiming an identity between marketplace freedoms and political liberties.
Cultivating Our Fiscal Soul
• When we choose how government should spend and tax, we open a window into our national fiscal soul
• Thinking about our larger obligations, and our opportunities to increase the happiness of society, in the real world -one removed from theoretical models of perfect markets and perfectly rational economic actors
• Fiscal policy thus is about applied moral philosophy as much as it is a story of incentives and preferences
• Both conservatives and progressives get things wrong: We need more government, not less, but we do not need steeply higher top marginal income tax rates to yield a richer, more equal, and happier society
